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ABSTRACT
This Article examines whether the conflict classification
paradigm for international humanitarian law (“IHL”) established by
the 1949 Geneva Conventions is adequate to regulate armed
conflicts that center, in whole or in part, on cyber operations. The
analysis herein, presented in seven parts, answers that question
affirmatively, but posits that the advent of cyber operations has
exposed certain gaps, ambiguities, and fault lines in IHL’s conflict
classification framework. After the Introduction, Part II provides
four examples of situations of violence—three of which amount to
armed conflicts under IHL and one that does not meet the
definitional criteria of armed conflict under IHL. Part III gives an
overview of conflict classification under IHL. Parts IV and V
examine international and non-international armed conflicts,
respectively. Part VI highlights four overarching tensions between
IHL’s conflict classification and cyber operations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Today, we live in a highly computerized, networked world1 in
which the speed, interconnectedness, and sheer volume of computer
interactions is growing at an exponential rate.2 States, industries,
and individuals are becoming ever more dependent on information
technology and its applications and connections. One need only
consider the so-called Internet of Things (“IoT”) to put this growth
trajectory into perspective. The IoT posits that one day any device
with an “on-and-off” switch will be capable of being connected to
the Internet. It is estimated by 2020 there will be over twenty-six
billion devices connected to the Internet.3
When experts at the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”)4 first created the precursor to
today’s Internet in 1969, it was not possible to predict the broad
social, political, and economic ramifications that would be directly
attributable to this new technology.5 What began as a medium for

1 See GEORG KERSCHISCHNIG, CYBERTHREATS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2012)
(describing the depth of global technological interconnectedness).
2 See BRANDON VALERIANO & RYAN C. MANESS, CYBER WAR VERSUS CYBER
REALITIES: CYBER CONFLICT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 20 (2015) (conveying the
fragility and vulnerability of a system reliant on digital technology).
3 See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things’, FORBES (May
13, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simpleexplanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#2543d2761d09
[https://perma.cc/XKV8-QZLL] (highlighting the almost endless number of
devices that could be connected to the Internet).
4 See About DARPA, DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/aboutdarpa [https://perma.cc/8XPU-PPXQ] (noting that the mission of DARPA is to
make critical investments in technologies for national security and the armed
forces). DARPA was formed during the Cold War, in part, out of a sense of national
fear and urgency because of technological advancements being made by the Soviet
Union. The Internet is but one of DARPA’s game-changing technological
innovations. Others include: precision weapons and stealth technology, automated
voice recognition and language translation, and Global Positioning System
receivers small enough to embed in consumer devices.
5 See generally DEP’T OF DEF., THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY
(2015),
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/1415_cyberstrategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RYA5-RAUK] [hereinafter DOD CYBER STRATEGY] (discussing
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scientists to quickly and easily share their research grew into an
interconnected system of computers and databases linking people
all over the world.6 Experts estimated that, “[b]y the end of 2018 . . .
51.2 percent of the global population . . . will be using the Internet.”7
Moreover, Internet access has increased by over two billion people
worldwide during the last decade alone.8 Food, water, and much of
society’s critical infrastructure are tied to computer networks, as are
transportation, health care, and financial services.9 Unsurprisingly,
this technology of mass empowerment that offers the brightest hope
and promise to humankind also produces the greatest concern for
peace, stability, and security.10 Sounding the alarm bell, then-U.S.
Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, in a speech at the Intrepid Sea,
Air and Space Museum in New York, issued a dire warning that the
United States was facing the possibility of a “cyber-Pearl Harbor”
and was increasingly vulnerable to foreign computer hackers. He
specifically commented:
An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these
kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches . . . .
They could derail passenger trains, or even more dangerous,
derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They
could contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut
down the power grid across large parts of the country.11

the wide-ranging influence of the Internet on today’s social, political and economic
landscape).
6 See generally id.
7 New ITU statistics show more than half the world is now using the Internet, ITU
News (Dec. 6, 2018), https://news.itu.int/itu-statistics-leaving-no-one-offline/
[https://perma.cc/9FV9-RR9X].
8
DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 1.
9 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND
ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 9
(William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) (conveying the
extent to which essential services to society are dependent on the Internet).
10 See BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: ROBOTS
AND GERMS, HACKERS AND DRONES: CONFRONTING A NEW AGE OF THREAT 20 (2015)
(acknowledging both the incredible benefits and incredible risks associated with
reliance on the Internet across sectors).
11
Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of
Cyberattack
on
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
11,
2012),
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Former Secretary Panetta, as well as many others, highlight the
important truth that technology, more than any other outside force,
shapes and defines current and future warfare.12 Of course, this is
not new. Technology and military operations have always, to one
degree or another, been inextricably linked.13 From the use of the
longbow to machine guns to laser-guided munitions and drones,
technological innovations often determine outcomes in war.14 With
respect to current and future warfare, it is nearly impossible to
overstate the importance of information technology. Today’s armed
forces use a range of weapons and munitions that are operated by
information technology. The command and control of military
forces is increasingly coordinated and directed through computerbased networks that allow common pictures and battlefield
analytics to be seen and shared. Logistics are entirely dependent on
information systems. And, of course, there are highly sophisticated
cyber weapons that can attack an adversary in both virtual and real
domains.15
In recent years, there has been an exponential growth in the
development of both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities
across the world. In many respects, cyber conflict has moved to the
forefront of many national agendas.16 Experts estimate that
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-ofcyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/3FPS-NDVZ].
12 See Alex Roland, War and Technology, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST., (Feb. 27,
2009),
https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/02/war-and-technology/
[https://perma.cc/3RGD-FV5K] (articulating the impact of technology on global
warfare).
13 See generally BINARY BULLETS: THE ETHICS OF CYBERWARFARE 1 (Fritz Allhoff,
Adam Henschke & Bradley Jay Strawser eds., 2016) (exploring the significant
integration of technology into military frameworks worldwide).
14 See Michael Marshall, Timeline: Weapons technology, NEW SCIENTIST (July 7,
2009),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17423-timeline-weaponstechnology/ [https://perma.cc/JB7K-JHJW] (discussing the evolution of weapons
in light of technological advances).
15 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 9, at 9 (examining
the capacity of cyber weapons to exploit vulnerabilities and exact damage in both
the physical and virtual realm).
16 See Gavin Alcott, Cyberwarfare: Policy Challenges for 21st Century Threats,
PENN
WHARTON
PUB.
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Dec.
6,
2016),
https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1607-cyberwarfare-policychallenges-for-21st-century
[https://perma.cc/G9TC-MM8K]
(assessing
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approximately 140 countries have developed, or are developing, a
capability to wage cyber war.17 Some countries, like the United
States, have established major military organizations focused on
cyberspace and operations.18 In addition to organizational changes,
there have also been significant doctrinal changes. For example, in
2016, NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations in
which the Alliance must defend itself as effectively as it does in the
air, on land, and at sea.19 Even with the dizzying pace of
technological change and innovation, it is important to note that the
current legal paradigm regulating conventional warfare (i.e., jus in
bello and jus ad bellum) also applies to cyberspace operations.20 The
relationship between these two branches of international law has
infrastructural vulnerabilities in the U.S. public and private sectors and identifying
policy gaps in the U.S. approach to cyber warfare).
17 See Kevin Coleman, Coleman: The Cyber Arms Race Has Begun, CSO (Jan. 28,
2008),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2122353/criticalinfrastructure/coleman--the-cyber-arms-race-has-begun.html
[https://perma.cc/3K8N-4EYC] (evaluating the threats and offensive capabilities
developing from the cyber arms race).
18 See
Mission
and
Vision,
U.S.
CYBER
COMMAND,
https://www.cybercom.mil/About/Mission-and-Vision/
[https://perma.cc/QAF3-8LJY] (noting that the mission of U.S. Cyber Command
is “to direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning and operations to
defend and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and
international partners.”).
19 See Tomáš Minárik, NATO Recognises Cyberspace as a ‘Domain of Operations’
at Warsaw Summit, CCDCOE (July 21, 2016), https://ccdcoe.org/nato-recognisescyberspace-domain-operations-warsaw-summit.html [https://perma.cc/6NX4XHZ6] (discussing the idea of treating cyberspace as a “domain of operations”). See
also David Alexander, Pentagon to treat cyberspace as “operational domain”, REUTERS
(July 14, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-cybersecurityidUSTRE76D5FA20110714 [https://perma.cc/6NX4-XHZ6] (illustrating the
United States’ decision to consider cyberspace one of the operational domains in
addition to land, air, sea).
20 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS 3 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]
(highlighting that jus ad bellum is focused on when a State may use force under
international law, but that some commentators have observed that the United
Nations Charter has created a legal regime that would more accurately be
characterized as jus contra bellum because it is fundamentally devised to prevent the
use of force). See also ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 13 (2010) (elaborating on the relationship
between public international law and the law of armed conflict).
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been controversial at times. Although a detailed discussion of that
relationship is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting
that jus in bello and jus ad bellum are distinct in purpose and
application and should not be conflated.21
This Article addresses issues related to jus in bello, also referred
to as international humanitarian law (“IHL”).22 Experts have widely
accepted that IHL23 applies to cyber operations undertaken in the
context of an armed conflict.24 Stated differently, cyber operations
in the context of an armed conflict are regulated by well-established
norms of IHL. Therefore, the challenge lies not in determining
whether the law applies, but rather in determining how, specifically,
the law applies to cyber operations. Digital means and methods of
warfare executed in both the virtual and real world pose novel
issues with respect to IHL. One of the most complex questions that
permeates IHL today is how to identify, analyze, and categorize
armed conflicts under the current binary conflict classification
paradigm established by the 1949 Geneva Conventions when such
conflicts include or are limited to cyber operations.
Under IHL, the classification of an armed conflict is the first step
in determining the rights and obligations incumbent on the parties
to that conflict. IHL recognizes two types of armed conflicts:
international and non-international. In an international armed

21 See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug.
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I] (noting in the preamble
that the application of the Protocol must be fully applied without any adverse
distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes
espoused by or attributed to the parties to the conflict).
22
International humanitarian law is also referred to as either the law of armed
conflict or the law of war.
23 See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 21–23 (2016) (discussing the wide acceptance of IHL’s
application to cyber operations during armed conflict).
24 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 375 (demonstrating that when one
thinks of the use of cyber in the context of an armed conflict, it not only involves
the employment of cyber capabilities to objectives in and through cyberspace, but
also involves weapons reviews to ensure that cyber means of warfare comply with
the law of armed conflict).
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conflict, the full corpus of IHL applies.25 By contrast, in a noninternational armed conflict, a more limited portion of IHL applies.26
Finally, in other situations of violence not amounting to an armed
conflict, such as sporadic violence, riots, or crime, IHL simply does
not apply. However, it is important to note: just because IHL does
not apply to a situation of violence does not suggest that there is an
international legal normative void. International and regional
human rights law, as well as the peacetime domestic law of the State,
still applies in those cases.27
In discussing the importance of conflict classification under IHL,
Professor Michael Schmitt stated:
Few international humanitarian law topics are proving as
problematic in modern warfare as ‘classification of conflict’,
that is, the identification of the type of conflict to which
particular hostilities amount as a matter of law. Classifying
the conflict in question is always the first step in any
international humanitarian law analysis, for the nature of the
conflict determines the applicable legal regime.
Accordingly, classification is a subject of seminal
importance.28
The legal and operational complexities associated with conflict
classification that include or are limited to cyber operations are
multi-faceted. The 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Operations addresses the question of conflict
25 See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL
APPROACH 71 (2012) (illustrating the application of IHL to both international and
non-international conflicts).
26 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOLUME I: RULES XXXIV (2005) (suggesting
that the amount of substantive IHL protections that apply to a non-international
armed conflict is not entirely clear; little codified law applies through common
Article 3, Additional Protocol II, and several other IHL treaties, but as a matter of
customary law, some influential thought leaders contend that the majority of the
substantive rules that apply to an international armed conflict also apply to a noninternational armed conflict).
27 See MARCO SASSÒLI, ANTOINE A. BOUVIER & ANNE QUINTIN, HOW DOES LAW
PROTECT IN WAR? 124 (2011) (noting that peacetime legal regimes likely provide
greater protections with respect to the use of force and detention than IHL).
28
Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.
245 (2012).
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classification under IHL in international and non-international
armed conflicts that include cyber-threat components. In its nearly
600 pages, the manual also addresses several other vital issues
spanning public international law. For context, in 2009, the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (“NATO CCD
COE”), a renowned cyber research and training institution in
Tallinn, Estonia,29 invited a group of independent experts to
produce a manual on the international law governing cyber
warfare—a manual now known as the Tallinn Manual 2.0.30 This
international group of experts, including distinguished scholars and
practitioners of international law, examined established legal norms
and the applicability of those norms to cyber warfare.31 In 2013, the
Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare was
published and released. As a result of the success of the first Tallinn
Manual, the NATO CCD COE initiated a follow-on project to update
the manual and expand its scope to include the international law
governing cyber activities during peacetime. This was also done, in
part, to respond to the evolving realities of threats and conflict in the
cyber realm: on a daily basis, States were wrestling with cyber issues
occurring below the threshold sufficient to constitute a use of force.
In fact, those events were far more prevalent than issues related to
the use of force or the conduct of hostilities, which were the domain
of the first Tallinn Manual.32
29 See
generally
About
Cyber
Defence
Centre,
CCDCOE,
https://ccdcoe.org/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/89CJ-2N4M] (discussing
that the mission of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is to
enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO
nations and partners in cyber defense through education, research and
development, lessons learned and consultation).
30 See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20.
31 See generally id.
32
Impressively, Tallinn Manual 2.0 contains 154 rules, including two specific
rules on international and non-international armed conflict, Rules 82 and 83. The
detailed commentary accompanying each rule not only offers important insights
into the deliberations and thought processes of the experts regarding the legal basis
and justification for the rules and their normative context, but also offers practical
implications of the rules’ application in a cyber context. This level of detail is
particularly helpful for national legal advisors and academics. Additionally, the
commentaries to the rules express the positions articulated by the experts in their
internal discussions so that it is evident to the reader whether the Experts were able
to reach a consensus on a particular issue. Finally, and most importantly, it is
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2. CYBER OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES
Armed conflicts that include or are limited to cyber operations
can be challenging to classify within the IHL legal framework. In
fact, some of the most well-known, highly publicized cyber
incidents fail to meet the threshold for either international or noninternational armed conflict under IHL. That is not to say that such
incidents occur in an international normative gap; they do not.
Rather, such incidents are regulated by legal regimes, whether
domestic or international, which otherwise operate during
peacetime.
Such legal regimes possess their own distinct
frameworks of rights, duties, processes, and potential sanctions.
The case studies outlined below highlight how four unique
situations of violence involving cyber operations are either
international or non-international armed conflicts subject to IHL
regulation or how they are neither.
The first case study involving Estonia is a situation not
amounting to an armed conflict. On April 27, 2007, Estonia was hit
by a large-scale, persistent series of distributed denial of service
(“DDoS”)33 attacks. These attacks overwhelmed and shut down the
websites of Estonian government ministries, political parties,
newspapers, banks, and companies.34 The attacks were particularly
harmful in Estonia—given its reliance on the Internet for everything
from grocery shopping and parking, to banking and voting. The
DDoS cyber-attacks were part of a larger protest movement35
following a highly-controversial decision by the Estonian
government to relocate a Soviet war memorial from its original
important to understand and appreciate that the experts were limiting themselves
to an objective restatement of the lex lata. They avoided including statements
reflecting the lex ferenda. See id. at 3 (highlighting the approach of the authors
regarding the concept of lex lata).
33 See id. at 564–65 (noting that DDoS is a method that employs many different
computing devices to cause a denial of service to single or multiple targets).
34 See HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE L AWS OF WAR 38–
39 (2014) (highlighting the attacks’ effects on Estonian websites).
35 See Steven Lee Myers, Estonia removes Soviet-era war memorial after a night of
TIMES
(Apr.
27,
2007),
violence,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/world/europe/27ihtestonia.4.5477141.html [https://perma.cc/CR6F-N33V] (discussing the removal of
a Soviet-era war memorial and resulting protests and violence).
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location in the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery on the
outskirts of the city. The Soviets originally built the monument in
1947 to commemorate their war dead after defeating the Nazis in the
Baltic region.36 The culprits of the cyber-attacks were believed to be
a small group of Russian activists associated with the pro-Kremlin
youth group, Nashi.37 These attacks appeared to come from Russian
IP addresses with online instructions written in Russian.
Furthermore, Russia ignored the Estonian government’s appeals for
assistance.38
The second case study involves the armed conflict between
Russia and Georgia in the summer of 2008—an effort to exert control
over an ethnic enclave bordering the two countries known as South
Ossetia. In 1990, South Ossetia had declared its independence from
Georgia and, following “a two-year war and an imperfect
ceasefire . . . operated for nearly two decades as [an] independent
state.”39 In 2008, Georgia launched a military offensive to retake
control of South Ossetia.40 Russia, which had long supported South
Ossetia’s secessionist efforts, sent its armed forces into South Ossetia
and also targeted important military and transport hubs situated
elsewhere within Georgia.41 Georgia’s defenses were wholly
36 See Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED
(Aug.
21,
2007),
https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/
[https://perma.cc/W9N9-7XEW] (providing background information on a war
memorial and the consequences facing the Estonian government for removing it).
37 See Christian Lowe, Kremlin loyalist says launched Estonia cyber-attack,
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-estoniacyberspace/kremlin-loyalist-says-launched-estonia-cyber-attackidUSTRE52B4D820090313 [https://perma.cc/9HU7-TEXS] (examining a proKremlin youth activist’s claim that the organization was behind the electronic
attack on Estonia).
38 See Damien McGuinness, How a cyber attack transformed Estonia, BBC (Apr.
27, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/39655415 [https://perma.cc/PX85-SNP6]
(noting the Russian government’s limited involvement in the Estonian conflict).
39
Stephanie Joyce, Along A Shifting Border, Georgia And Russia Maintain An
Uneasy
Peace,
NPR
(Mar.
13,
2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/03/13/519471110/along-ashifting-border-georgia-and-russia-maintain-an-uneasy-peace
[https://perma.cc/GF4J-5Z3W].
40 See id. (explaining that, in August 2008, “Georgia launched an offensive of
the breakaway region.”).
41 See Charles King, The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia
Crisis,
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
(Nov.-Dec.,
2008),

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

654

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:3

inadequate to rebuff Russia’s aggressions, and the ensuing five-day
armed conflict killed hundreds of people and sent thousands of
refugees to temporary shelters.42 In addition to the kinetic fight,
Russia launched cyber operations against Georgia both before and
during the international armed conflict. In so doing, Russia
demonstrated the effectiveness of cyber operations in support of a
conventional conflict.43 In particular, a number of Georgian
government websites were defaced and had their content replaced
with anti-Georgian messages.44 In fact, the multiple D.D.O.S. attacks
resulted in the website of the Georgian president being inoperable
for 24 hours.45 The cyber-attack, overall, severely limited Georgia’s
ability to disseminate information.46 At the operational and tactical
levels, it is believed that Russian cyber operations were closely
coordinated with conventional forces to enhance operational
effectiveness. For example, “networks and web sites within specific
geographic locations were targeted for denial and disruption
operations in order to cause panic and uncertainty (disruption) in
the Georgian civilian population.”47 As noted by David Hollis,
Russia’s use of cyber operations against Georgia “appears to be the
first case in history of a coordinated cyberspace domain attack
synchronized with major combat actions in the other warfighting
domains (consisting of Land, Air, Sea, and Space).”48
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2008-11-01/five-day-war
[https://perma.cc/KY8B-K9AK] (discussing the response of Georgian forces to
attacks by secessionists in South Ossetia).
42 See id. (describing the consequences of the attacks by secessionists in South
Ossetia).
43 See DINNISS, supra note 34, at 8 (
explaining Russia’s approach to its
conflict with Georgia).
44
MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 8 (2016) (describing the positive effects of cyber operations in Russia).
45
John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html (noting the
effects of the cyberspace attack on Georgia).
46 Id.
47
David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS JOURNAL (Jan.
6, 2011), https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VG99-JTES].
48 Id. See also generally PAUL ROSENZWEIG, CYBER WARFARE: HOW CONFLICTS IN
CYBERSPACE ARE CHALLENGING AMERICA AND CHANGING THE WORLD 33 (2013)
(detailing the Russian–Georgian war).
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The third case study is Operation Olympic Games, a highly
sophisticated and targeted cyber-attack, reportedly launched (but
never officially acknowledged) by the United States and Israel
against an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz, Iran. Fred
Kaplan’s book, Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, details
the events leading up to the operation beginning in 2006. According
to Kaplan, President Bush wanted to derail or slow down the Iranian
nuclear program. President Bush did not, however, want to launch
airstrikes against the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility. Instead, he
sought an option between doing nothing and a kinetic attack.
President Bush settled on a cyber-attack on the computer control
systems at the Natanz facility.49 After creating and covertly
inserting a cyber “beacon” into the Iranian computer network to
map out the workings of the plant, attackers inserted a highly
complex worm, sometimes called “Stuxnet,”50 into the plant’s
computer controller system.51 The Stuxnet worm took over some of
the uranium enrichment centrifuges operated by the control system,
making them spin either too fast or too slow.52 This process made
them unbalanced and, in some cases, caused centrifuges to explode.
Over time, new variants of the Stuxnet worm were created and
surreptitiously inserted into the control systems resulting in slightly
different failures.53 Stuxnet was designed to leave no trace of the

49 See generally FRED KAPLAN, DARK TERRITORY: THE SECRET HISTORY OF CYBER
WAR 203–4 (2016) (describing the American government’s response to Operation
Olympic Games).
50 See Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital
Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-tozero-day-stuxnet/ [https://perma.cc/95UT-84HS](discussing the discovery of the
Stuxnet by a Belarus security firm hired to troubleshoot a series of computers in
Iran that were malfunctioning).
51
Guilbert Gates, How a Secret Cyberwar Program Worked, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/how-asecret-cyberwar-program-worked.html
[https://perma.cc/TP4Y-DZU6]
(describing the way secret cyberwar programs work).
52 See
Uranium
Enrichment,
U.S.
NRC
(Aug.
2,
2017),
https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html
[https://perma.cc/3CFB-XXM4] (describing the process of uranium enrichment).
53
See Gates, supra note 51 (discussing the changes made to Stuxnet and the
resulting consequences of those changes).
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attackers.54 General Michael Hayden, the former director of the
NSA and CIA, commented on this milestone in modern warfare:
Previous cyber-attacks had effects limited to other
computers . . . This is the first attack of a major nature in
which a cyber-attack was used to effect physical destruction.
And no matter what you think of the effects--and I think
destroying a cascade of Iranian centrifuges is an unalloyed
good--you can’t help but describe it as an attack on critical
infrastructure . . . .Somebody has crossed the Rubicon.
We’ve got a legion on the other side of the river now.
Something had shifted in the nature and calculation of
warfare, just as it had after the United States dropped atom
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaskai at the end of World War
II.55
The last case study involves the United States’ fight against the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”). In addition to conventional
and special operations combat against ISIS fighters in Iraq, Syria,
and elsewhere, the United States launched a new cyber campaign
against ISIS forces in 2016.56 Such a response to ISIS is appropriate
and necessary, in part, because no other non-State armed group in
history has capitalized more on information technology. ISIS has
demonstrated that it is extremely adept at using this technology for
such functions as command and control of its forces, recruitment,
and propaganda, among other things.57 One particular operation
against ISIS, code-named Operation Glowing Symphony, was carried
54
Paul Szoldra, A new film gives a frightening look at how the US used cyberwarfare
to destroy nukes, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 7, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/zerodays-stuxnet-cyber-weapon-2016–7 [https://perma.cc/XP3V-HAFG] (discussing
the effects of Stuxnet). But see David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of
TIMES
(June
1,
2012),
Cyberattacks
Against
Iran,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-orderedwave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html
[https://perma.cc/6U4T-DFUQ]
(describing a programming error that caused an element of the program to become
public).
55
KAPLAN, supra note 49, at 215.
56
David E. Sanger, U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/usdirects-cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/U5ED-6JK8]
(discussing how the United States directed cyber weapons at ISIS).
57 See id. (discussing ISIS’s proficient use of technology).
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out by U.S. Cyber Command’s Joint Task Force Ares.58 As part of
the operation, Task Force Ares removed ISIS propaganda and
locked ISIS administrators out of their accounts. A debate arose,
however, surrounding whether the U.S. must disclose its plan to
conduct cyber operations to countries whose servers may house ISIS
data, outside of the battlefields of Syria and Iraq.59 One significant
impact that has been attributed, at least in part, to cyber operations
against ISIS is the reduction in the number of foreign fighters going
to Mideast conflict zones to join ISIS—new recruits have dropped
from 2,000 per month to 500, and overall personnel strength has
dropped from 35,000 to 20,000.60
These four case studies on cyber operations illustrate the
spectrum of conflict in the cyber realm. Depending upon where the
situation falls along the spectrum, IHL either does not apply at all,
applies minimally, or applies fully. Without question, some cases
are more difficult to assess than others, as will be seen in the analysis
below. Implicit in any analysis of conflict classification is the fact
that there must be some nexus between the cyber operation or
activity and the conflict for IHL to apply. In other words, if a cyber
activity occurs but is unrelated to the armed conflict, IHL does not
regulate it. Not surprisingly, there can be significant debate as to
the nature and scope of that nexus.61 Beyond that threshold
connection, looking at conflict classification under IHL through a
cyber lens raises many challenging issues.
58
Ellen Nakashima, U.S. military cyber operation to attack ISIS last year sparked
heated
debate
over
alerting allies, WASH. POST
(May 9,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-military-cyberoperation-to-attack-isis-last-year-sparked-heated-debate-over-alertingallies/2017/05/08/93a120a2-30d5-11e7-9dec764dc781686f_story.html?utm_term=.6cc9d75e8b91
[https://perma.cc/9SGU86C3] (explaining how the U.S. government conducted Operation Glowing
Symphony).
59 See id.
60
Rowan Scarborough, Obama launches first cyberwar against isis, cuts recruiting
TIMES
(Sept.
12,
2016),
by
75
percent,
WASH.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/12/obama-administrationtakes-isis-fight-into-cybersp/ [https://perma.cc/JR9W-K9X2] (asserting a
relationship between the Obama administration’s first cyberwar and a reduction in
the number of foreign fighters joining the terrorist army in Syria).
61 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 376 (discussing the relationship
between IHL and cyber conflicts).
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3. CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW—AN OVERVIEW
For the period following the Peace of Westphalia up until the
end of World War II, the jus in bello applied almost exclusively to
wars between States.62 Unpacking this historical context, Professor
Akande observed:
This was a consequence of the fact that international law as
a whole was concerned only with relations between States
and eschewed regulations of matters considered to be within
the domestic jurisdiction of States. Internal armed conflicts,
or civil wars, were not considered to be ‘real war[s] in the
strict sense of the term in International Law,’ since that term
was reserved for conflicts between States.63
IHL applied to internal armed conflicts only under very limited
circumstances, in which either the State involved or a third State
recognized the belligerency of the insurgent group.64 Recognition of
belligerency was permitted—thereby triggering IHL—if the
insurgent group: (1) occupied territory; (2) established a
government which exercised sovereign rights over the territory it
occupied; and (3) complied with the laws and customs of war during
hostilities with the State.65 In the aftermath of World War II, there
were seismic changes to IHL generally and conflict classification
specifically.
On August 12, 1949, a diplomatic conference in Geneva,
Switzerland approved the text of four conventions—the 1949
Geneva Conventions—which more States have ratified than any
62 See Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in
32 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 33 (Elizabeth
Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (discussing the classification of conflict type during the
specified time period).
63 Id.
64 See id. (discussing the growing application of IHL to intra-State warfare in
the years leading up to World War II, particularly during the and Spanish Civil
War).
65
Dietrich Schindler, Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE SCOPE AND
APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 48 (Michael N. Schmitt &
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg eds., 2012) (citation omitted).
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other international agreements in the laws regulating warfare.66 The
Conventions were, in part, borne out of the unprecedented violence
and suffering of World War II.67 As Ambassador George H. Aldrich
commented:
[T]he history of development of this branch of international
law is largely one of reaction to bad experience. After each
major war, the survivors negotiate rules for the next war that
they would, in retrospect, like to have seen in force during
the last war. The 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions attest
to that pattern.68

66 See ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE L AWS OF WAR 195
(2000) (describing the four 1949 Geneva Conventions). To provide some
background and context, the Geneva Conventions can be traced back to a well-todo Swiss businessman, Henry Dunant, and the Battle of Solferino in 1859. The
Battle of Solferino in Lombardy, not far from Milan and Verona, was fought
between the forces of Austria and a French-Piedmontese alliance. The battle was
one of the bloodiest of the 19th century with thousands of dead and wounded on
both sides. The military practice of the time was to leave the wounded where they
had fallen on the battlefield. Dunant witnessed the carnage. After the battle, he
provided aid and comfort to survivors. Dunant could not forget what he saw and
experienced. In 1862, he published a small book entitled A Memory of Solferino. In
the book, Dunant vividly and graphically described the battle and the suffering of
the wounded soldiers. He also called for the creation of relief societies in each
country that would act as auxiliaries to the army medical services and facilitate care
for all wounded and sick, regardless of State affiliation. This effort led eventually
to the formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Also, as part of
Dunant’s vision in A Memory of Solferino, he proposed that an international principle
be created to serve as the basis for these societies. Dunant’s idea ultimately led to
the Swiss government hosting an official diplomatic conference in August 1864,
which resulted in the adoption of the first Geneva Convention. In 1901, Dunant
was awarded the first-ever Nobel Peace Prize for what was accurately described as
the “supreme humanitarian achievement of the 19th century.” See Solferino and the
International Committee of the Red Cross, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (June 1, 2010),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2010/solferinofeature-240609.htm [https://perma.cc/5T44-4DWN] (discussing Dunant’s
contributions to Red Cross and Geneva Conventions).
67 See Philip Spoerri, Director of Int’l Law, Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Address at
the Ceremony to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions (Dec.
8, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/genevaconventions-statement-120809.htm [https://perma.cc/L36W-5SZP] (discussing
the origins of the Geneva Conventions).
68
SOLIS, supra note 23, at 88.
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Generally speaking, the 1949 Conventions expanded the scope
of IHL to include the addition of a fourth convention that focused
on the protection of civilians during armed conflicts.69 Additionally,
the other three Conventions were updated and revised.70 Among
the revisions was the creation of two articles that are included, in
identical form, in all four of the Geneva Conventions – Common
Articles 2 and 3. More influential than other treaties, the four 1949
Geneva Conventions are the cornerstone of modern IHL.71
Of the many important contributions made by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions to the corpus of IHL, perhaps none is of greater
consequence than the binary conflict classification paradigm
prescribed by common Articles 2 and 3.72 This new legal
classification framework marked a sea change in the
conceptualization of wars. As mentioned previously, the jus in bello
was developed in the context of wars between States, applying only
to conflicts of an international nature with little application to civil
wars.73 Moreover, the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, and 1929
did not have a specific provision defining the scope of their
application.74 It was not until the 1949 Geneva Conventions that a
69 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, ar. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
70 See CORN ET AL., supra note 25, at 70 (describing the four Geneva
Conventions).
71 See SOLIS, supra note 23, at 88 (describing the Geneva Conventions).
Historically, the jus in bello was perceived to have two traditions or families: “Hague
Law” and “Geneva Law.” The primary focus of Hague Law was to regulate the
conduct of hostilities. By contrast, Geneva Law focused on the protections of the
victims of armed conflict. Today, those distinctions do not exist. IHL is an
amalgamation of both Hague and Geneva Law. Id.
72 See Id. at 91 (describing the Conventions’ articles). As the name implies,
common articles are contained in all four Geneva Conventions. That is, the
substance of the articles is so important that the drafters of the Conventions
included the same or similar articles in each of the four Conventions. In a sense,
the common articles, along with certain general principles, link the four
Conventions. The common articles, of which there are about twenty, are found
among the general provisions at the beginning of each Convention, among the
articles relating to treaty execution, and among the concluding procedural
provisions. See also ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 66, at 195 (discussing the common
articles among the Geneva Conventions).
73 See Akande, supra note 62, at 33 (discussing conflict classification).
74 See INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY OF 2016, art. 2, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&doc
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distinction between international armed conflicts and noninternational armed conflicts was codified.
The scope and applicability of IHL depends on the existence of
an armed conflict.75 This is true for both international and noninternational armed conflicts because IHL did not adopt a unitary
concept of an armed conflict.76 Interestingly, even though the notion
of an armed conflict is perhaps the single most important concept in
IHL, it has never been defined by a treaty.77 Some publicists have
even commented that the drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
avoided a rigid definition of an armed conflict because such a
formulation might limit the applicability of the treaties.78 To fully
understand and appreciate the binary conflict classification
paradigm, it is necessary to look at common Articles 2 and 3
separately.
4. COMMON ARTICLE 2: INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even
if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even
if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to
the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto
umentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518#_Toc452041590 [hereinafter
2016 COMMENTARY, GC I].
75 See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 20, at 74 (discussing the application of the laws
of armed conflicts).
76 Id.
77 See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 45 (2012) (discussing
various attempts to define armed conflicts).
78 See SOLIS, supra note 23, at 159 (discussing the implications of defining an
armed conflict for IHL purposes).
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shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the
said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.79
At its core, this foundational provision establishes the
circumstances and conditions under which the four Conventions
apply.80 Specifically, the Conventions, in their entirety, are triggered
by a declared war,81 an international armed conflict, or a partial or
total occupation.82 A fourth situation covering wars of national
liberation was added with Article 1(4) of Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (“Protocol
I”).83 This provision “widened the scope of applicability of the law
79
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I].
80 See 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at para. 192 (“This provision is a
central pillar of the Geneva Conventions as it establishes the circumstances and
conditions under which the Conventions apply.”).
81 See id. at paras. 203–209 (defining declared war).
82 See Geneva I, supra note 79, at art. 2. The portion of IHL that addresses a
total or partial occupation is embodied in selected provisions of the Annexed
Regulations to Hague Convention IV of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, and customary international law. Accordingly, the entirety of IHL is triggered
when a successful invader establishes effective control over enemy territory. That
is, a territory is considered occupied once it is placed under the authority of a hostile
army.

See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art.1(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. Article
1(4), sometimes referred to as the “CARs” provision (colonial domination, alien
occupation, and racist regimes), was one of the objectionable points for the United
States in terms of ratifying AP I. The provision provided as follows:
83

4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations.
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governing international armed conflicts by recognizing so-called
‘internationalized’ wars, although the kinds of armed conflict that
fall into that ‘new’ category remain unsettled.”84 Thus, if the factual
situation meets the criteria for one of the four situations outlined
above, it can be said to be an international or inter-State armed
conflict. 85 It is important to note that it does not matter whether a
party or parties to the armed conflict deny the existence of an armed
conflict for political or other reasons. Conflict classification depends
only on the circumstances prevailing on the ground at the time.86 Of
course, the key inquiry from an IHL perspective is when an armed
conflict exists between two or more States such that the body of law
is triggered.87
To adequately address this question, it is necessary to provide
some background and context about several important IHL concepts
related to or embedded in common Article 2. First, the general
criteria in common Article 2 have crystallized into rules that govern
the applicability of all IHL rules under international armed conflicts,
for both customary and conventional law, and are not limited only
to the applicability of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.88
Accordingly, all IHL treaties, including older ones, as well as

The essence of the objection is that it blurs the distinction between international and
non-international armed conflicts based upon the asserted motive of the non-State
group fighting against the government of a State. See SOLIS, supra note 23, at 133
(explaining the U.S. objection to ratifying the Convention).
84
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Introduction, in THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 65, at xi.
85
KOLB & HYDE, supra note 20, at 74.
86
2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at para. 211 (“Article 2(1) underlines
the pre-eminence of the factual existence of armed conflict over the formal status of
war.”).
87 See Akande, supra note 62, at 39 (discussing how to define an armed
conflict). Although beyond the scope of this Article, there is also the question of
when an international armed conflict ends. Assessing the end of an armed conflict
can be a very difficult matter. An international armed conflict ends when there has
been a general close of military operations. See CORN ET AL., supra note 25, at 70
(“The drafters [of Common Articles 2 and 3] responded to the inherent insufficiency
of the international definition of war as the trigger for law application, by including
law triggering articles in the revised Conventions and the humanitarian protections
they provide.”).
88
KOLB & HYDE, supra note 20, at 75.
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customary international law applies to a declared war, an
international armed conflict, or a partial or total occupation.89
Second, as highlighted previously, common Article 2(1)
introduced, but did not define, the term “armed conflict” into the
IHL lexicon, making the application of the law less dependent upon
the formalisms associated with a declared war.90 The term “armed
conflict” connotes an objective standard to be assessed on the basis
of the prevailing facts.91 As such, from 1949 onwards, the notion of
armed conflict supplanted the traditional concept of war under
IHL.92 Because the term “armed conflict” was not defined in the
1949 Geneva Conventions or in any other IHL treaty, Common
Article 2 in no way qualifies “the armed conflict” with scope,
duration, or intensity requirements.93 This leaves the interpretation
and amplification of the term “armed conflict” in the hands of
tribunals and commentators to provide such clarity.
Third, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) proposed a definition of
international armed conflict in its landmark Tadić (Appeal on
Jurisdiction) case. The Tribunal stated, in part, as follows:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to
armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State. International
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed
conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until
a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of
internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until
that moment, international humanitarian law continues to
Id.
See 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at para. 193 (“Article 2(1)
broadens the Geneva Conventions’ scope of application by introducing the notion
of ‘armed conflict’, thereby making their application less dependent on the
formalism attached to the notion of ‘declared war’.”).
91 Id. at para. 211 (“[T]he determination of the existence of an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2(1) must be based solely on the prevailing facts
demonstrating the de facto existence of hostilities between the belligerents, even
without a declaration of war.”).
92
SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 122.
93
CORN ET AL., supra note 25, at 74.
89
90
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apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the
case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place
there.94
Having established that legal scaffolding, the next task is to
determine what “international” and “armed” mean in terms of
common Article 2. In this regard, “‘[i]nternational’ . . . is effectively
synonymous with inter-state.”95 The most obvious situation
involves two or more States as parties to the conflict on opposing
sides.96 Furthermore, a conflict is internationalized when a nonState armed group—acting under the control of a State party—
engages in hostilities against an opposing State party.97 Again, from
the Tadić case, the ICTY considered the issue of whether Bosnian
Serb units were sufficiently directed by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to conclude that an international armed conflict existed
for the purposes of conflict classification under IHL.98 In articulating
the overall control standard, the Appeals Chamber stated, in part, as
follows:
[C]ontrol by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias
or paramilitary units may be of an overall character (and
must comprise more than the mere provision of financial
assistance or military equipment or training).
This
requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each
individual operation. Under international law it is by no
means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan
all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose
their targets, or give specific instructions concerning the
conduct of military operations and any alleged violations of
international humanitarian law. The control required by
international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or,
94
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
95
CORN ET AL. supra note 25, at 82.
96
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 380.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict)
has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the
military actions of the military group, in addition to
financing, training and equipping or providing operational
support to that group.99
Under this standard, the legal threshold is relatively high for
internationalizing a conflict that involves subordinate or “proxy”
forces. Accordingly, merely providing support to non-State actors
does not internationalize it pursuant to common Article 2.100
Moreover, a non-State armed group, as a collective entity, means
something more than just an individual or an insufficiently
organized group.101 Put in a slightly different way, the overall
control test is a manifestation of the application of well-established
legal principles of the law of State responsibility in determining
whether and when non-State armed groups amount to de facto
agents of a third State.102 In contrast to the “international”
requirement under common Article 2, the “armed” requirement can
be even more complex in theory and application.
In Tadić, the ICTY set and reinforced a relatively low legal
benchmark for the “armed” element of an international armed
conflict. The standard the court created is: “whenever there is a
resort to armed force between States.”103 As such, there is neither a
duration requirement nor an intensity requirement in terms of the
number of victims or the destruction of property. Even with this
low standard, which is intended to provide the broadest possible
IHL coverage, there are some situations that would not trigger an
international armed conflict in terms of State practice. For example,
the replacing of border patrol agents with members of the armed
forces; an accidental incursion into the sovereign territory of another
State; or the accidental bombing within the territory of another
99
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 137
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
100
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 381.
101 Id.
102
SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 122 (explaining the standard
rule that “a conflict between governmental forces and rebel forces within a single
country becomes of international character if the rebel forces are de facto agents of a
third State”).
103
Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 94, at ¶ 70.
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country would not, in and of themselves, trigger an international
armed conflict under IHL.104 The 1960 commentary to the Third
Geneva Convention succinctly synopsized the intent of States with
respect to the low “armed” requirement under common Article 2:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the
intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed
conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the
Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no
difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter
takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces; it
suffices for the armed forces of one Power to have captured
adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4. Even if there
has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the
Convention are detained is sufficient for its application. The
number of persons captured in such circumstances is, of
course, immaterial.105
Applying the above to digital operations, Tallinn Manual 2.0 -Rule 82 speaks to cyber operations in the context of an international
armed conflict. It states: “[a]n international armed conflict exists
whenever there are hostilities, which may include or be limited to
cyber operations, between two or more States.”106 Two of the above
case studies may fairly be characterized as international armed
conflicts under Rule 82 and two may not.
The first is the most straightforward and arguably the least
controversial, i.e., the international armed conflict between Russia
and Georgia in 2008. But, as the analysis below will demonstrate,
even the most straightforward incident raises significant legal issues
when the conflict includes or is limited to cyber operations. In the
Russian-Georgian international armed conflict over South Ossetia,
there were cyber operations that occurred before and during the

BOOTHBY, supra note 77, at 45.
COMMENTARY, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR 67 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument
&documentId=07B4DAD7719E37E4C12563CD00424D17 [https://perma.cc/7J3PK5UN] [hereinafter Commentary, GC III].
106
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 379.
104
105
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conventional fighting.107 The cyber operations launched by Russia
against Georgia raise a number of challenging questions. The first
question is: when precisely did the international armed conflict
commence? The answer to this question is important because the
start date is what triggers the application of IHL.108 As early as July
20, 2008, there were DDoS attacks that shut down Georgian
servers.109 On or about August 8, 2008, Russia conducted airstrikes
against Georgian targets and Russian troops physically moved into
South Ossetia to provide support to the separatists in their fight
against Georgia.110
So, did the armed conflict start on August 8th with the
conventional attack, or did it begin approximately three weeks
earlier with the DDoS attacks? Complicating that answer are two
other related, subsidiary questions. The first is the ever-thorny
question of attribution. Who precisely authorized and conducted
the cyber operations against Georgia: military electronic warriors,
patriotic hackers, cyber criminals, or some other groups? In
cyberspace, it is easy to cloak identities, operate through thirdparties, and route operations through servers from around the
world, making it very difficult to attribute the cyber operations to a
particular State, group, or individual.111 Also, with respect to the
DDoS attacks beginning on July 20th, was there a sufficient nexus
between those cyber-attacks and the conventional armed conflict
that began three weeks later? Given the above, even the most
uncomplicated scenario is riddled with uncertainty about when the
international armed conflict started and who precisely was a party
to it. Over and above the other questions, assuming arguendo, that
the organization that launched the cyber operations against Georgia
was either an organ of the Russian State or a de facto agent of Russia,
Hollis, supra note 47, at 2–3.
See generally Markoff, supra note 45 (elaborating on the extent of cyber
operations conducted against Georgia and when those activities began).
109 Id.
110
Michael Schwirtz, Anne Barnard & C. J. Chivers, Russia and Georgia Clash
TIMES
(Aug.
9,
2008),
Over
Separatist
Region,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/world/europe/09georgia.html
[https://perma.cc/PC4P-NBFQ].
111 See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, Top Georgian Official: Moscow Cyber Attacked Us
–
We
Just
Can’t
Prove
It,
WIRED
(Mar.
11,
2009),
https://www.wired.com/2009/03/georgia-blames/
[https://perma.cc/H248TTBC] (noting the difficulties of pinpointing the sources of cyber operations in the
investigation of an attack against Georgian cyber infrastructure).
107
108
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were the DDoS attacks a “resort to armed force” sufficient to trigger
an international armed conflict? Alternatively, should the DDoS be
viewed merely as another form of a conventional attack—like any
other type of military preparation of the battlefield? Should the
focus be on the usefulness or effectiveness of the preparation, rather
than the format (cyber)? These questions do not lend themselves to
easy answers. In sum, the above gaps, ambiguities, and fault lines
highlight that even the most uncomplicated scenario is strewn with
uncertainty and complexity because it included cyber means and
methods and occurred, at least in part, in cyberspace.
Although not one of the case studies, an interesting corollary to
the Russian-Georgian international armed conflict from a cyber
operations perspective was Russia’s use of cyber operations against
Ukraine.112 Since July 2014, there has been an international armed
conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
Parenthetically, this
international armed conflict is parallel to an ongoing noninternational armed conflict in Ukraine.113 And, of course, Russia
occupied and then annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in
2014.114 From a cyber operations perspective, the most well-known
incident occurred in 2015 when the electricity was cut for nearly a
quarter-million Ukrainians by highly sophisticated hackers who
successfully attacked a power grid. Additionally, about a year later,
a transmission station was taken down through a cyberattack.115
112 See
generally Ukraine
Fast
Facts, CNN (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/28/world/europe/ukraine-fastfacts/index.html [https://perma.cc/P34E-WAZY] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017)
(providing basic factual information about Ukraine and a timeline of important
developments in Ukraine’s national history relating to Russia).
113 International Armed Conflict in Ukraine, RULE L. ARMED CONFLICTS PROJECT
(RULAC) GENEVA ACAD. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. & HUM. RTS., (Sept. 11, 2017),
http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/international-armed-conflict-inukraine#collapse2accord [https://perma.cc/JM4G-PS3D] (last visited Oct. 16,
2017) (recognizing that the available information does suggest the existence of an
armed conflict in eastern Ukraine from July 2014).
114 See Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crimea, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-tookcrimea [https://perma.cc/7RKX-UC5H] (delineating interpretations of Putin’s
motives for annexing Crimea).
115 See Was Russian Hacking of Ukraine’s Power Grid a Test Run for U.S. Attack?,
CBS NEWS (June 23, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-hacking-ofukraines-power-grid-test-run-for-us-attack/
[https://perma.cc/RS8X-WU89]
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Since then, there has been a growing roster of Ukrainian companies
and government agencies that have been plagued by cyberattacks,
often being hit in rapid succession.116 Additionally, cyber security
experts detected a malware implant on Android devices which was
used to track the movements of Ukrainian artillery units and then
target them. The significance of such a cyberattack is obvious.
Hackers were able to access the communications of its adversaries
and the geolocations of the devices themselves, which enabled
Russia to effectively target Ukrainian artillery.117 Unsurprisingly,
the Ukrainians accused the Russians of these cyber operations.
Oleksandr Tkachuk, the Chief of Staff for Ukraine’s Security Service,
alleged that the cyberattacks were coordinated by the Russian
security service with assistance from private software firms and
criminal hackers. Moscow has repeatedly and persistently denied
accusations that it has engaged in cyber operations against
Ukraine.118
The Stuxnet case study also raises the question of whether the
cyber operation against SCADA systems at an Iranian nuclear fuel
processing plant triggered an international armed conflict under
IHL.119 The Stuxnet case is different from the previous situations of
(examining Russia’s desire to destabilize Ukraine through its power grid as a
warning to the U.S.).
116 See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for
Cyberwar, WIRED (June 20, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackersattack-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/NV5N-9WWA] (addressing Russia’s use of
Ukraine as a laboratory for perfecting new forms of global online combat).
117 See Shaun Walker, Group Allegedly Behind DNC Hack Targeted Ukraine,
Report
Finds,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
22,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/22/dnc-hackcrowdstrike-ukraine-malware-russia [https://perma.cc/HV45-J6NW] (describing
the electronic attack on Estonia conducted by a pro-Kremlin youth group).
118 See Natalia Zinets, Ukraine Charges Russia with New Cyber Attacks on
Infrastructure, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usukraine-crisis-cyber/ukraine-charges-russia-with-new-cyber-attacks-oninfrastructure-idUSKBN15U2CN [https://perma.cc/5AK8-99YF] (elaborating on
the use of Telebots, a new mechanism to infect computers that control
infrastructure, and Moscow’s continued insistence that it is not responsible for
cyberattacks against Ukraine).
119
Beyond any jus in bello questions, the Stuxnet case also raises jus ad bellum
issues. More specifically, did the Stuxnet attack meet the threshold for an armed
attack under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter? Even if one disagrees that
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violence involving Russia and Georgia/Ukraine in some important
respects. First, the cyber operation against Iran was not linked to a
conventional operation, but was exclusively cyber. To put a finer
point on it, the Stuxnet virus was created and used to avoid a kinetic
strike against the Iranian plant.120
However, Stuxnet was
distinguishable from some other cyber operations in that it caused
physical damage. With respect to the specific question of whether
the Stuxnet virus triggered an international armed conflict, there are
queries about both the “international” and “armed” elements. On
the international element, no State, including Russia, has ever
officially acknowledged that they were responsible for the attack.
Much has been written and reported attributing Stuxnet to the
United States and Israel. As of this writing, neither State has
publicly acknowledged a connection to Stuxnet. Therefore, it is
difficult to conclusively and officially state who is responsible for
the virus. That being said, given the sophistication and expense of
the attack, it seems likely that a State was involved. As to the
“armed” element, the Experts contributing to Tallinn Manual 2.0
were divided as to whether the damage to the centrifuges was
sufficient to meet the armed requirement, and therefore could not
make a ruling regarding whether the actor was “armed.”
Consequently, it is very difficult to conclusively determine that
Stuxnet amounted to an international armed conflict under IHL.
The third case study that has a possible nexus to common Article
2 and an international armed conflict is the 2007 Estonia DDoS
incident. The Estonians initially believed that the Russians launched
the cyberattacks against them for several reasons. First, the
cyberattacks appeared to be linked to the relocation of a Soviet Red
Army soldier memorial thereby pointing to a motive.121 Second, all
the Stuxnet virus amounted to an armed attack, it clearly met the threshold for
prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
120
KAPLAN, supra note 49, at 204. See also The Editors, Here’s How to End the
Fog
of
Cyber
War,
SCI.
AM.
(June
1,
2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/here-s-how-to-end-the-fog-ofcyber-war/ [https://perma.cc/7ACE-32AC] (describing the agendas international
entities and countries are pushing to create a cybertruce and cooperate during
cybercrime investigations).
121 See McGuinness, supra note 38 (identifying Russia as potentially
responsible for the cyberattack while acknowledging that the identification is
unproven and makes retaliation difficult).
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of the websites that were targeted by the DDoS attacks were in
Estonia. Third, Russian websites were used in planning, facilitating
and coordinating the cyberattacks. Fourth, those who planned and
coordinated the attacks were fluent in Russian. Fifth, Estonian
authorities traced Internet addresses used in the attacks back to
Russian government agencies.122 Finally, Estonian appeals to
Moscow for assistance were ignored.123 The culprits of the attacks
were ultimately believed to be a small group of Russian patriotic
hacktivists associated with the pro-Kremlin youth group called
Nashi (“Ours”), engaged in an online political protest.124 However,
based off these facts, under IHL, the 2007 Estonian DDoS attack did
not rise to the level of an international armed conflict for two
reasons.
First, there is insufficient evidence that Nashi or other hacktivists
who perpetrated the attack were operating pursuant to instructions
of the Russian government or under Russian direction or control. As
a practical matter, it is very difficult to prove that a State is
controlling a non-State group with respect to the group’s actions in
cyberspace.125 This is especially true when, like the present case,
Russia never endorsed or adopted the conduct.
Second, it would be difficult to say that a DDoS attack by itself
meets the threshold of “armed” under common Article 2. As noted
by the Experts to the Tallinn Manual 2.0, the conduct of hostilities
under IHL presupposes a collective application of means and
methods of warfare.126 Of course, this begs the harder question -122
SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS: THE EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE
NATION STATE 85–86 (2009).
123 See McGuinness, supra note 38 (explaining how Estonia created the
voluntary, “shadowy” Cyber Defence unit in response to Russia’s unwillingness to
provide assistance).
124 See Andrew Roche, Kremlin Loyalist Says Launched Estonia Cyber-Attack,
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-estoniacyberspace/kremlin-loyalist-says-launched-estonia-cyber-attackidUSTRE52B4D820090313 [https://perma.cc/9HU7-TEXS] (providing more
details on the pro-Kremlin group, Nashi, which is responsible for the electronic
attack on Estonia that paralyzed the state’s Internet network).
125
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 380 (noting that if a State merely
supports the actions of a non-State group, that is insufficient to internationalize the
situation. Under IHL, the threshold for internationalizing a conflict remains a high
one).
126 Id. at 383.
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does there have to be a threshold of requisite violence to meet the
“armed” criteria to trigger IHL under common Article 2? As
mentioned previously, the commentary to the Third Geneva
Convention makes clear there is no intensity requirement. The
drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions intended the threshold of
international armed conflict to be low to ensure IHL applied when
States were resorting to armed force against each other.127 By having
a low threshold, the conflict would be subject to the international
rule of law and the victims of the conflict would benefit from
humanitarian protections. Of course, the 1949 Geneva Conventions
were drafted and the 1960 commentary was written well before
anyone could envision cyber operations and DDoS attacks. Those
who believe there should be an intensity requirement point to State
practice. This practice indicates there have been a number of
incidents, such as sporadic border incidents or naval incidents that
were not treated or characterized as international armed conflicts.128
Professor Gary Solis characterizes such incidents as armed conflicts
short of war and contends persuasively that such incidents do not
trigger an international armed conflict. Professor Solis also noted
that a “key indicium [is] whether the incident is protracted. The
longer an incident continues, the more difficult it is to describe it as
merely an incident.”129 By analogy, a single DDoS attack that causes
only limited damage, destruction, injury, or death would not
necessarily be considered a trigger for an international armed
conflict.
Candidly, there are some good arguments that the DDoS attacks
in Estonia might have risen to the level of an “armed conflict.” Chief
among these arguments is the intensity of the attacks and their
protracted nature. The incident lasted weeks and targeted both
public and private sectors. For one of the most wired countries in
the world like Estonia, a sustained, two-week DDoS incident is more
than just an inconvenience. Arguably, if Estonia had not been as
sophisticated and adept at defending itself as it proved to be, the
2007 DDoS attacks would have been far more devastating.130
However, the greater weight of the available evidence militates
127
128
129
130

Commentary, GC III, supra note 105, at 22–23.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 383.
SOLIS, supra note 23, at 162.
BRENNER, supra note 122, at 85.
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against such a conclusion. Ultimately, the hostilities that took place
in Estonia did not constitute the “collective application of means and
methods of warfare” sufficient to constitute an “armed conflict.”
Thus, the Estonia incident cannot fairly be characterized as an
international armed conflict and, therefore, IHL does not apply.131
The primary reason for this conclusion is that the connection
between Nashi and the Russian government was too nebulous and
the purposefully high threshold for internationalizing an armed
conflict was not met.
In sum, whether a particular situation amounts to an
international armed conflict under common Article 2 depends upon
a totality of the circumstances. Such determinations are often quite
subjective and challenging, particularly when considering incidents
involving new means, methods, and domains of warfare like cyber.
The next step in the multi-tier analysis is to consider noninternational armed conflicts.
5. COMMON ARTICLE 3: NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
Non-international or internal armed conflicts are armed conflicts
that do not occur between States. From a humanitarian perspective,
the victims of international and non-international armed conflicts
face similar problems and need similar protections.132 In some cases,
the savageness and brutality of civil wars are even greater than those
of international armed conflicts.133 For combatants or fighters
conducting hostilities in the context of international or noninternational armed conflicts respectively, the distinction between
the two types of conflicts may seem academic and quite divorced
from reality. States, on the other hand, have never agreed to treat
international and non-international armed conflicts equally.134
Generally speaking, since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, acts of
sovereign leaders within their own territory have not been matters

131
132
133
134

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 382.
SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 323.
KOLB & HYDE, supra note 20, at 66.
SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 323.
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for international concern or regulation.135 States have always
considered non-international armed conflicts internal affairs
regulated by domestic laws.136 As mentioned above, prior to the
adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) was only intended to regulate wars
between States with the limited exception of belligerency. The
initiation and waging of war was an exercise of sovereign power
held by States.137 Treating an internal conflict as ‘war’ and subjecting
it to international norms would have unduly elevated the status of
those perpetrating violence as non-state actors.
The sea change occurred with the addition of common Article 3
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3, sometimes
referred to as the “convention in miniature,” may be the most
significant innovation to the 1949 Geneva Conventions because it
established baseline humanitarian protections for the victims of
non-international armed conflicts.138 Prior to 1949, there were no
codified provisions of IHL that specifically addressed noninternational armed conflicts.139 Common Article 3 was the first of
its kind. Specifically, it provides as follows:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as
a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed ‘ hors de combat ‘ by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.

SOLIS, supra note 23, at 104.
SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 324.
137
2016 COMMENTARY, GC I art. 3, supra note 74.
138
SOLIS, supra note 23, at 104.
139
ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 25 (2010) (noting the absence of substantive
international humanitarian law relating to non-international armed conflicts).
135
136
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To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the
Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should
further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.140
The protections of common Article 3 were supplemented in 1977
with Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.141
Classifying non-international armed conflicts is more difficult than
international ones. There are several reasons for this conclusion.
Geneva I, supra note 79, art. 3.
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS
609,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html
[https://perma.cc/2WYD-HPVU]. Additional Protocol II (“AP II”) has only 28
articles and is not substantively controversial. Its material field of application is set
to a high threshold. To trigger the application of Additional Protocol II, the
dissident armed forces or other organized groups must exercise such control over
a part of the territory of the State as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations. The U.S. has not ratified AP II, but many of its
principles are recognized as customary international law. Common Article 3 does
not have a similar “territorial control” requirement.
140
141
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First, States are generally reluctant to classify situations of
violence in their territory as non-international armed conflicts for
fear that doing so would not only legitimize a group or groups
fighting against the government, but also because it would trigger
international regulation under IHL. The second reason why it is
more difficult to classify non-international armed conflicts stems
from the definition of the term itself. Common Article 3 defines a
non-international armed conflict in the negative.
A noninternational armed conflict is defined as a conflict that is “not of an
international character”. It is defined in contradistinction to an
international one, as opposed to being a conflict in its own right. A
third point is that there are situations of violence that occur within a
State that fall below the threshold of an armed conflict. These
include: riots, criminality, and sporadic acts of violence that do not
trigger a non-international armed conflict. Again, because “armed
conflict” was never defined in the corpus of IHL, the threshold for a
non-international armed conflict developed through international
case law. Not surprisingly, in its landmark Tadić case, ICTY set forth
two criteria for a non-international armed conflict. These criteria
reflect customary international law: intensity of the hostilities and
organization of the armed group.142 The ICTY stated, in the
pertinent part, as follows:
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of
an armed conflict for the purposes of the rules contained in
Common Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the
intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to
the conflict. In an armed conflict of an internal . . . character,
these closely related criteria are used solely for the purpose,
as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from
banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or
terrorist activities, which are not subject to international
humanitarian law.143
Similar to international armed conflicts, there are a number of
issues raised when looking at non-international armed conflicts
142 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 387 (explaining that the holding
of is “widely accepted as seeting forth the two key criteria for qualification as a noninternational armed conflict”).
143
SOLIS, supra note 23, at 164 (citation omitted).
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through the lens of cyber operations. The starting point for such an
analysis is Rule 83 of Tallinn Manual 2.0, which acknowledges that
non-international armed conflicts may include or be limited to cyber
operations between governmental armed forces and organized
groups or between one or more organized groups (without the
involvement of governmental armed forces).144 Rule 83, which is
also a reflection of customary international law, reiterates that the
protracted armed violence must meet the Tadić criteria.145 As a
threshold matter, the Experts in Tallinn Manual 2.0 recognized that,
in theory, cyber operations alone, without kinetic actions, could
trigger a non-international armed conflict because the application of
IHL does not depend upon a specific type of military operation, or
a particular means or method of warfare.
They did note, however, that this would be an “exceptional” case
because of the threshold of violence required and the level of
organization of the group resorting to such violence.146 In terms of
the organization requirement, which is a factual, context specific
determination, the ICTY commented that the non-State armed
group does not have to have the organizational structure of a State
party’s conventional military unit. Some degree of organization by
the non-State armed group will be sufficient to meet the standard.147
There are a number of factors that may be helpful in making such a
determination: the organization and structure of the armed group,
the use of internal regulations; the capacity to engage in coordinated
military operations; the ability to provide military training, and the
ability to enforce discipline and ensure compliance with IHL.148 The
significance of these criterion is that it would preclude lone hackers,
144 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 385 (setting forth Rule 83: “A
non-international armed conflict exists whenever there is protracted armed
violence, which may include or be limited to cyber operations, occurring between
governmental armed forces and organized armed groups, or between such
groups”).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 385–86.
147
NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS & RUSSELL BUCHAN, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 337 (2015) (arguing that the transcendental
nature of cyber warfare reignites the disagreement as to whether common article 3
places a spatial element on non-international armed conflict, therefore limiting its’
the geographical scope).
148 Id. at 338.
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or even individuals ideologically sympathetic to a particular cause
acting collectively but not as a coordinated entity, from meeting the
organizational requirement.149
The larger question is whether “virtual groups” that organize
exclusively online could meet the organization criteria. Even
though such groups are able to carry out cyber operations in a
coordinated matter, most commentators believe that such groups
are not sufficiently organized to meet the Tadić organization
requirement. The reason is simple -- virtual groups lack the ability
to enforce discipline and ensure compliance with IHL.150 They have
no physical control over their members. The classic example of such
a group is the collective “Anonymous.” This decentralized group of
international hacktivists has been linked to a number of high-profile
incidents, including internet attacks on governments, major
corporations, financial institutions and religious groups.151
Notwithstanding their effectiveness and high profile, Anonymous
would arguably not meet the criteria for a non-State armed group
under IHL because it does not possess the ability to enforce
discipline within its membership, nor to ensure that its members
comply with IHL. Of course, virtual groups raise thoughtprovoking questions like the extent to which the capacity to enforce
rules and discipline is a critical component of an organization for
classification purposes. Another good question is whether physical
control is a necessary precondition for the purpose of organization.
The second requirement for determining whether an episode of
violence constitutes the initiation of a non-international armed
conflict is the intensity of the violence. As previously mentioned,
for the purpose of triggering a non-international armed conflict, the
hostilities between the parties must reach a certain level of
intensity.152 Criteria indicating a sufficient intensity level would
include, but are not limited to: the gravity and frequency of attacks,
Id.
Id.
151
Geneva Sands, What to Know About the Worldwide Hacker Group
‘Anonymous,’ ABC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/worldwidehacker-group-anonymous/story?id=37761302
[https://perma.cc/D3M7-PY5T]
(detailing the identity and principles of the hacker group “anonymous”, specifically
focusing on the manner in which broad membership runs the gamut of the
organization).
152
TSAGOURIAS & BUCHAN, supra note 147, at 340.
149
150
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the temporal and territorial expansion of the violence; the collective
nature and scope of the hostilities; the control of the territory by the
non-State armed group, the number and type of governmental
forces responding to the violence; the type and distribution of
weapons used by the armed group; the extent to which the
population has been effected or displaced by the hostilities; and
whether the situation of violence has come to the attention of the
United Nations Security Council.153 In the Commentary to Rule 83,
the Experts provided a non-exhaustive list of activities that would
not meet the intensity requirement, including but not limited to:
network intrusion, the deletion or destruction of data, computer
network exploitation, defacing websites, data theft, as well as the
blocking of certain Internet functions or services.154
With respect to intensity, one of the issues the Experts struggled
with was whether a non-destructive, but severe, cyber operation
could cause a violent situation to transform into a non-international
armed conflict.155 Necessarily intertwined with this is the question
of whether this same situation would trigger the application of
common Article 3.156 Such a cyber operation coupled with other
actions could cumulatively surpass the intensity threshold for a noninternational armed conflict. For example, suppose a non-State
armed group conducts a cyber-attack against a State’s armed forces
and exploits and destroys data vital to the defense of the State. That
cyber operation, coupled with certain physical acts of violence,
could certainly tip the balance and transform a situation of violence
into a non-international armed conflict.157
Id. at 340–1.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 388.
155 Id. at 389. Depending on the specific factual circumstances, it may also
trigger Additional Protocol II.
156 Id.
157
Conversation with Tomas Minarik, Senior Research at the NATO CCD
COE (October 15, 2017). Left unanswered, however, is whether a cyberattack that
is not coupled with certain physical acts of violence could transform a situation of
violence into a non-international armed conflict. For example, if a non-State entity
used cyber means to map out the strength, capabilities, and disposition of its
adversary’s armed force for potential use in a future attack, would the
extensiveness of the intrusion and the sensitivity of the information collected suffice
to meet the intensity threshold? Or would it depend upon the occurrence of a
subsequent attack?
153
154
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The last case study involving ISIS illustrates a non-international
armed conflict which involved the use of cyber operations. To
provide greater context, the armed conflict involving ISIS in Syria,
Iraq, and elsewhere in the world is complex and difficult to classify,
in part, because of all of the contending parties involved, State and
non-State. Although sorting out the nuances of all of the conflict
classification issues with ISIS is well beyond the scope of this article,
it is fair to say that most of the hostilities involving ISIS are noninternational armed conflicts because ISIS is a non-State armed
group.158 With ISIS, there is no doubt that they meet the Tadić
intensity and organizational criteria.159 To the degree that there is
an issue, it relates to the geographical scope of the non-international
armed conflict.
In 2016, the United States National
Counterterrorism Center reported that the Islamic State was
operational in 18 different countries around the world. It also found
indications of what it characterized as “aspiring branches” in Mali,
Egypt, Somalia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines.160 As
will be discussed below in more detail, the geographical dimensions
of non-international armed conflicts are difficult to conceptualize in
the context of cyber operations.161 Beyond the specific issues
associated with cyber operations in common Articles 2 and 3, there
are also gaps, ambiguities, and fault lines inherent in conflict
classification under IHL, writ large.

158 See David Wallace, Amy McCarthy, & Shane Reeves, Trying to Make Sense
of the Senseless: Classifying the Syrian War under the Law of Armed Conflict, 25 MICH.
ST. INT’L. L. REV. (Aug. 21, 2017) (detailing the actors involved in the Syrian Civil
War and classifying them under international law, including ISIS).
159 See Christopher Woody, US Special Operations Command Chief Claims ‘60,000
to 70,000’ ISIS Fighters Have Been Killed, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jul. 24, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/gen-raymond-thomas-socom-60000-to-70000isis-fighters-killed-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/35QA-FBUV] (detailing that at any
given time, it is difficult to determine how many fighters belong to ISIS. “In 2014,
an observer group estimated the terror group had 100,000 fighters. The Pentagon
said in summer 2016 that it had just 15,000 to 20,000 fighters left in Iraq and Syria.”)
Id.
160 See ISLAMIC STATE AND THE CRISIS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA IN MAPS, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034
[https://perma.cc/PX6D-5HYY] (last visited Oct 8, 2017) (explaining the results of
recapturing Iraq and Syria territory which were previously claimed by jihadist
groups).
161 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20 at 378 (describing geographical
limitations on the law of armed conflict).
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6. CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION AND CYBER: GAPS, AMBIGUITIES, AND
FAULT LINES
The binary classification paradigm established by the 1949
Geneva Conventions goes to the very heart of the regulation of
armed conflicts. As presented above, cyber operations pose several
challenging issues with respect to the application and interpretation
of common Articles 2 and 3. Beyond those specific issues, there are
a number of overarching complexities that create gaps, ambiguities,
and fault lines with respect to applying IHL to cyber operations
generally and to issues related to conflict classification specifically.
The first involves the problem of attribution.
Attribution is considered an intractable theoretical and practical
problem permeating every aspect of cyber operations. Commenting
on attribution, author Joel Brenner wistfully observed that, “the
internet is one big masquerade ball. You can hide behind aliases,
you can hide behind proxy servers, and you can surreptitiously
enslave other computers to do your dirty work.”162 Hence,
attribution creates technical, policy and legal issues. From a
technical perspective, attribution can be utterly perplexing because
hackers have tools, tactics, and techniques that effectively and
efficiently cover their tracks. One method a cyber intruder can use
is a so-called botnet. Botnets are a network comprised of computers
remotely controlled by an intruder to conduct coordinated cyber
operations. With no practical limit to the number of bots that can be
assimilated into a botnet, it could become extremely difficult to
know the origin of any given cyber operation.163
From a policy perspective, some influential thought leaders have
argued that there is a misplaced “attribution fixation” for many who
believe that attribution must start at the lowest, most technical
levels. They argue persuasively that it is necessary to take one step
back and think more broadly about attribution. Under this
argument, the focus should be placed on those things that decision162 See Marco Roscini, Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State
Responsibility for Cyber Operations in CYBER WAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL
CONFLICTS 215 (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015) (explaining that evidentiary
problems in inter-state litigation are not peculiar to cyber operations).
163 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20 at 563 (describing neutrality and
Security Council actions).
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makers actually need to know about a cyber-attack. What they
really need to know is who is ultimately responsible for the attack.
Knowing who actually pressed the keys is not necessarily
dispositive or particularly helpful unless it leads to insights into who
is ultimately culpable for the attack.164 Finally, with respect to
attribution and the law, there are many challenging issues. The
Experts who worked on Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed, as a general
matter, regarding the ex ante uncertainty as to the attribution of
cyber operations, noting:
States must act as reasonable States would in the same or
similar circumstances when considering responses to them
[cyber attacks].
Reasonableness is always context
dependent. It depends on such factors as reliability,
quantum, directness, nature (e.g., technical data, human
intelligence), and specificity of the relevant available
information when considered in light of the attendant
circumstance and the importance of the right involved.
These factors must be considered together. Importantly in
the cyber context, deficiencies in technical intelligence may
be compensated by, for example, the existence of highly
reliable human intelligence.165
In terms of the classification of international and noninternational armed conflicts, the problem is somewhat obvious.
Under IHL, conflict classification is premised on the assumption that
the identity of one’s adversary is known.166 To the degree, conflict
classification issues arose regarding attribution, it typically involved
the question of whether the conduct of a non-State armed group was
legally attributable to a State. As discussed above, that is an
important issue because it could have the effect of internationalizing
the armed conflict thereby placing it under common Article 2
instead of common Article 3. The outcome of this analysis could also
164 See Jason Healy, The Spectrum of National Responsibility for Cyberattacks, 18
BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 43–56, 43 (2011) (explaining that the cyberdefense
community must accept the idea that national policy makers need to know the
responsibility for an attack).
165 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 82 (describing the law of
international responsibility for wrongful acts by a State).
166 See TSAGOURIAS & BUCHAN, supra note 147, at 332 (explaining how to classify
cyber warfare).
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mean the conduct at issue is not covered by IHL at all. Of course,
the attribution issue goes beyond the non-State actors being de facto
agents for States. The ability of State and non-State armed groups
to be virtually anonymous in carrying out cyber operations is a
reality; put more prosaically --”electrons don’t wear uniforms.”167
States targeted with cyber operations often find their response
options severely limited in the absence of an identifiable perpetrator
of the operations.168 Logically, absent the ability to attribute the
cyber operation to a State party or non-State armed group, conflict
classification is impossible.169 Future advancements in technology
may make attribution easier. But, as it stands now, attribution
efforts are often enormously time-consuming and require extensive
technical and non-technical investigative means and analytical
techniques to gather, preserve, and analyze the evidence.170
The second issue concerns the current status of the binary
classification paradigm and how that relates to cyber operations. In
many ways, the binary conflict classification paradigm and the
consequences that flow from it has evolved both substantively and
procedurally over the last seven decades. First, in terms of
substance, there has been a general tendency to reduce the
differences between the rules that are applicable to international and
non-international armed conflicts.171
This trend toward
convergence to more of a unitary legal standard under IHL can be
seen in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals, the
influence of human rights laws and even some international
agreements that specify the application in international and non-

167 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 19, at 139
(describing how to characterize an incoming cyberattack and its attribution).
168 See Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Proxy Wars in Cyber Space: The Evolving
International Law of Attribution, FLETCHER SECURITY REVIEW 55 (2014) (describing that
a multilevel legal analysis is required in order to attribute cyber activities of a nonstate group or individual, or even in some cases another state to a state as a matter
of international law).
169
This assumes, of course, there is no conventional or kinetic “resort to
armed force” that could be used as the basis to classify a conflict.
170 See TSAGOURIAS & BUCHAN, supra note 147, at 332 (explaining how to classify
cyber warfare).
171 See SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 124 (describing general
protection of populations against certain consequences of war).
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international armed conflicts.172 Commenting on this movement
toward convergence, an ICRC publication stated, in part, as follows:
[I]t has even been suggested in some quarters that the
differences be eliminated altogether. In the many fields
where the treaty rules still differ, this convergence has been
rationalized by claiming that under customary international
law the difference between the two categories of conflict has
gradually disappeared. The ICRC study on Customary
International Humanitarian Law comes, after ten years of
research, to the conclusion that 136 (and arguably even 141)
out of 161 rules of customary international humanitarian
law, many of which are based on rules of Protocol I
applicable as a treaty to international armed conflicts, apply
equally to non-international armed conflicts.173
Although far from settled or agreed upon, there is certainly some
logical appeal to the notion that there is a substantive body of
customary IHL that applies to both international and noninternational armed conflicts.174 Encapsulating this notion, in Tadić,
ICTY noted that, “what is inhumane and consequently proscribed,
in international wars, cannot but be inhumane in civil strife.”175
However, it is highly unlikely there will ever be a complete
convergence of the IHL governing international and noninternational armed conflicts. The reason is simply that States will
never agree to combatant status for members of non-State armed
groups fighting against governments in non-international armed
conflicts. To provide such a status would mean that such fighters
would have combatant immunity and be entitled to prisoner of war
status upon capture. It is simply unfathomable States would go that
far even if driven by altruistic humanitarian impulses or more
pragmatic concerns like encouraging reciprocity by the insurgents.
From a conflict classification perspective, the significance of
convergence is that it leaves an erroneous impression that the
Id.
Id.
174 See EMILY CRAWFORD & ALISON PERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
71 (2015) (explaining that conditions set out in Article 1 mean that the Protocol’s
scope of application is narrower than that of Common Article 3).
175 Id. citing Tadić Jurisdiction, paras. 117–26.
172
173
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distinction between international and non-international armed
conflicts is not vitally important. This false impression may be
exacerbated when the conflict at issue is limited to or primarily
conducted by cyber operations, which already lack the traditional
feel of a conventional armed conflict.
Notwithstanding the concerns mentioned above, the most
significant issues are procedural176 in nature. That is, hostilities over
the past two decades are not always easily or neatly classified as
either an international or non-international armed conflict as was
envisioned and proscribed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. For
example, some scholars have progressively theorized that, in
addition to international and non-international armed conflicts,
there are now “transnational armed conflicts” which have been born
out of State practice. This type of conflict arguably emerged from
counter-terror military operations between States and non-State
groups outside the territory of the State.177 There are also mixed
conflicts that have both internal and international characteristics.
Such conflicts may require a legal determination as to conflict
classification at each particular phase of the operation to ensure the
correct portion of IHL is being applied.178 Additionally, there are
some situations that have been characterized as “armed conflicts
short of war.”179 This category might encompass a border or coastal
incident between States involving limited, short-lived violence.
There are also situations of violence in an ungoverned territory in
failed States that may create conflict classification challenges. And,
176
In this context, the term “procedural” is intended to frame how and when
the substantive rules apply. For example, procedurally, common Article 2 and
common Article 3 delineate which rules apply under given circumstances.
Substantively, this means that individuals taking part in a conflict deemed to be an
international armed conflict (and, therefore, governed by common Article 2) would
be accorded the status of “combatant.”
177 See Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A
‘Principled’ Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL
L. REV. 46 (2009) (explaining that LOAC principles must be identified and must be
broad enough to provide the authority necessary to bring the transnational enemy
to submission).
178 See Akande, supra note 62, at 63 (providing the example of intervention by
multinational forces under UN command or authorized by the UN).
179 See SOLIS, supra note 23, at 161 (including cross-border terrorist attacks by
non-state Actors).
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of course, there is cyber warfare. Commenting on the procedural
challenges associated with cyber operations, Professor Schmitt
observed:
In the future, cyber warfare will further complicate
classification. Cyber operations have the potential for
producing vast societal and economic disruption without
causing physical damage typically associated with armed
conflict. They are also inherently transborder, thereby
frustrating any approach to classification based on
geographical factors. Moreover, massive attacks can be
launched by a single individual or by a group that is
organized entirely online. This is in sharp contrast to
traditional warfare, which depends on either the
involvement of a State’s armed forces or that of a group
capable of mounting typical military operations.180
Given the above, it is clear that the traditional binary
classification paradigm is being stressed both substantively and
procedurally. The emergence of cyber operations will only
exacerbate these stresses.
A third issue relates to how traditionally-understood
geographical limitations, which are part of the fabric of IHL, are to
be conceptualized and considered in cyber operations. These limits
are particularly germane in non-international armed conflicts. That
is, the geographical scope of non-international armed conflicts
under common Article 3 has been a matter of intense debate for
some time. One view is that the plain language of common Article
3 signifies that non-international armed conflicts are limited to the
territory of a single State. This is the most restrictive approach.181 It
traces its origin to the first sentence of common Article 3 which
seems to limit the application of the rule to armed conflicts “not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
See Schmitt, supra note 28, at 246 (explaining that cyber operations have the
potential for producing vast societal and economic disruption without causing the
physical damage).
181 See Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International
Armed Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUDIES 1, 9 (2014) (explaining that according to the most
restrictive approach to the geographical scope of non-international armed conflict
based on Common Article 3, conflicts take place within a State’s geopolitical
borders).
180
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High Contracting Parties.”182 Going beyond the specific language of
common Article 3, non-international armed conflicts have
traditionally been understood to be conflicts occurring within the
confines of a particular State. Such conflicts are also referred to as
“internal” armed conflicts.183 A logical inference under this
interpretation is that an armed conflict that crosses State borders
becomes an international armed conflict.184
A second, more palatable position is that the word “one” in the
first sentence of common Article 3 refers to any of the State parties
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.185 Given that the 1949 Geneva
Conventions are the most ratified treaty in the history of the world
(with every recognized State in the world having ratified all four
conventions),186 the phrase would impose no territorial limitation.187
Additionally, as noted in the 2016 Commentary to common Article
3, the object and purpose of the article supports its application
beyond the territory of one State. That is, the aim of common Article
3 is to provide persons not participating or no longer actively
participating in hostilities with baseline humanitarian protections
during non-international armed conflicts. Therefore, it is logical that
those same protections would apply when such situations of
violence span the territory of more than one State.188 As such, it is
possible to have a non-international armed conflict against ISIS that
spans many countries. Of course, when one considers the above
debate in light of cyber operations, the fault lines are somewhat
obvious. More specifically, cyber operations in furtherance of and
closely related to non-international armed conflicts can be launched
Geneva I, supra note 79, art. 3.
See Commentary, GC III, supra note 105, at 455 (commenting that noninternational armed conflicts have been understood as conflicts occurring within
the limits of a single states, which are described as “internal” armed conflicts).
184
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 386. This presumes that both parties
are States, or a State and a proxy of another State.
185 Id.
186
SOLIS, supra note 23 at 88.
187 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 386 (explaining that the phrase
imposes no territorial limitations so long as the relevant States are Parties to the
Conventions).
188 See 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at 467 (discussing the purpose
of common Article 3 which leads to providing persons with protections when
violence spans beyond the territory of one State).
182
183
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remotely, far removed from the territory in which the conventional
hostilities are happening.189 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 Experts
“acknowledged the existence of a narrower approach that accepts
the possibility of a non-international armed conflict that crosses
borders, but which imposes a requirement of geographical
proximity to the State involved in the conflict.”190
Additionally, in interpreting common Article 3, questions have
been raised as to whether IHL applies to the entire territory of a State
in which a non-international armed conflict is occurring or whether
the application of the law is limited to only that portion of the State
where hostilities are occurring. Put in a slightly different manner,
in the regions of a State that are peaceful, do the State’s criminal laws
and procedures provide a sufficient legal framework?191 The Tallinn
Manual 2.0 Experts opined that in a non-international armed conflict,
the application of IHL is not limited only to areas of active hostilities.
Rather, IHL would apply to the entirety of the State.192 There is,
189 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 386–7. As noted by the Experts,
some States have weak or ineffective regulatory mechanisms to prevent or stop
cyber activity from occurring on their territories. Such States could be an appealing
base of cyber operations for non-State actors to attack governments in other States
where non-international armed conflicts are occurring.
190 Id. at 382. This attempt at creating a geographical limitation does not
appear workable in the cyber realm given the difficulty of attribution.
191 See 2016 COMMENTARY, CG I, supra note 74, at 456–64 (discussing whether
the application of humanitarian law concerns the whole of the State or is limited to
areas where hostilities are occurring).
192 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 386. There is ample support
for the position of the Experts. First, the language of common Article 3 itself
supports their position. It provides that “[t]o this end, the following acts are and
shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever.” Second, in Tadić,
the ICTY stated, in part, as follows:

67. . . . the temporal and geographical scope of both internal and
international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of
hostilities. . . .
69. . . . beneficiaries of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are
those taking no active part (or no longer taking active part) in the
hostilities. This indicates that the rules contained in Article 3 also apply
outside the narrow geographical context of the actual theatre of combat
operations. . . .
70. . . . international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole
territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole
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however, a practical limitation on the application of IHL anywhere
in the State. That limitation is rooted in the foundational
requirement that for IHL to apply there must be a nexus between
the conduct in question and the armed conflict.193
A fourth, and final, reason for the gaps, ambiguities, and fault
lines with respect to applying IHL to cyber operations concerns the
“militarization” of cyberspace. There has been a great deal of
discussion and debate about this issue.194 That concern is reflected
in a number of ways. For one, States are establishing military
organizations that are developing cyber offensive and defensive
capabilities. Cyberspace has been designated as an operational
domain for warfighting purposes.195 Important thought leaders, like
Brad Smith, the President of Microsoft, called for a digital Geneva
Convention in 2017. In his speech entitled, “Protecting and
Defending against Cyberthreats in Uncertain Times,” Smith
highlighted the troubling fact that recent years have seen an
expansion in the number of incidents whereby States have engaged
in cyber operations against other States.196 He forcefully argued that
territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes
place there.
See also 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at 457–68 citing ICTY, Tadić Decision
on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1995, at 67–70
(emphasizing that once a non-international armed conflict occurs, Article 3 applies
in the territory of the concerned State in its entirety).
193 See 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at 460 (noting that the
applicability of humanitarian law in the whole territory of a State party to the
conflict is subject to the condition that a particular act must be related to the nonintentional armed conflict).
194 See Sean Lawson, Is the United States Militarizing Cyberspace?, FORBES (Nov.
2, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2012/11/02/is-the-unitedstates-militarizing-cyberspace/#1d260267798d
[https://perma.cc/QLX3-6F7R]
(discussing the definition of militarizing cyberspace and whether the United States
is militarizing cyberspace or not).
195 See
Cyber
Defence,
NATO
(Jul.
16,
2018),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2018) [https://perma.cc/W68N-CGGL] (noting that NATO recognized cyberspace
as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it
does in the air, on land and at sea).
196 See Brad Smith, Protecting and Defending against Cyberthreats in Uncertain
Times, RSA Conference, https://www.rsaconference.com/videos/protecting-anddefending-against-cyberthreats-in-uncertain-times
[https://perma.cc/5T8U-
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the 2014 Sony attack by North Korea was a turning point.197 In that
highly publicized cyber incident, North Korean hackers stole
confidential documents and data from a Hollywood studio and
posted them online. U.S. government officials believe that North
Korea targeted Sony because it backed the film, “The Interview,”
which depicts an assassination plot against the North Korean leader,
Kim Jong-Un.198 Using militaristic language and imagery, Smith
described cyberspace as a new battlefield, albeit different than the
other war fighting domains of land, sea, air, and space. In doing so,
Smith eloquently and thoughtfully laid out arguments for a new
international treaty.199 He specifically noted:
We need a convention that will call on the world’s
governments to pledge that they will not engage in
cyberattacks on the private sector. That they will not target
civilian infrastructure, whether it’s of the electrical or the
economic or the political variety. We need governments to
pledge that instead they will work with the private sector to
respond to vulnerabilities. That they will not stockpile
vulnerabilities and they will take additional measures.200
The problem, of course, is that the Sony incident neither
triggered the application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
specifically, nor IHL, generally. Such violations of sovereignty fall
under a peacetime international law regime. This example is
illustrative of a much larger trend. That is, the vast majority of
incidents that occur in cyber space between States or States and non4XAZ] (noticing the increase of nation-state cyber-attacks in recent years and
discussing the ways to protect and defend against cyberthreats).
197 Id.
198 See Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec.
18,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hackexplained/?utm_term=.b8aac1f6ebdc [https://perma.cc/3R5V-HW4E] (detailing
the events surrounding the Sony Pictures hack that lead to a leak of a large amount
of confidential data and which is attributed to the North Korean government
retaliating on the release of a Sony-backed film entitled “The Interview” about the
assassination of the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un).
199 Id.
200 David Post, Microsoft’s Brad Smith on cyberattacks, cybersecurity, and
‘cyberspace’,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
10,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/03/10/microsofts-brad-smith-on-cyberattackscybersecurity-and-cyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/P5Q4-76CS].
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State armed groups are below the threshold for an armed conflict
and, therefore, do not trigger IHL. Therefore, to protect and
preserve IHL for its intended purposes, cyber activities must be
carefully and appropriately analysed and categorized under the IHL
binary classification system. Otherwise, IHL runs the risk of being
watered down and marginalized in the long run.
7. CONCLUSION
The issue of conflict classification is arguably the single most
important inquiry when applying IHL. It is always the first step in
establishing a framework to analyse any IHL issues. Even though
the binary classification paradigm established by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions is already stressed by contemporary conventional
conflicts, and will be stressed even further by the emergence of
cyberspace operations, the binary classification system remains the
best way for the international community to conceptualize, classify,
and (in some fashion, at least) control this new domain of warfare.
Given the continuously-evolving nature of cyber operations, it
remains all the more important to maintain a body of law that has
withstood the test of time while achieving near-universal
acceptance. The binary classification system within IHL remains
viable. Accordingly, it should be preserved and reinforced.
There are three reasons for this conclusion. First, going back to
first principles, IHL applies to cyber operations in the context of an
armed conflict. With very few treaties that deal directly with cyber
operations and with State practice often being highly classified,201 it
is critically important to interpret and analyze the established lex lata
of IHL in the context of cyber operations. When it comes to IHL,
there is nothing that is more foundational than common Articles 2
and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. To deviate from or
marginalize the IHL conflict classification paradigm because of the
novelty and nuances of cyberspace operations would be unwise. In
other words, the development of IHL should be evolutionary, not
revolutionary. This important work should be viewed as an effort
to bring cyberspace under the mantle of existing law, not to create
an entirely new framework.

201 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that State cyber practice
is mostly classified and that publicly available expressions of opinio juris are sparse).
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A second, and related, point is that there is very little incentive
for States to agree to anything that legitimizes non-State armed
groups fighting against governmental forces. Therefore, there will
always be at least two categories of armed conflict. Moreover, even
though there are some unique characteristics to modern day
conflicts, such as fighting against non-State groups in the territory
of another State, the paradigm still procedurally works. Stressed
does not mean broken. To the extent that ambiguities and gaps in
the law remain, States can and should do more to clarify and
facilitate the orderly and thoughtful development of IHL.
The third reason relates to the militarization of cyberspace.
International humanitarian law reflects a delicate balance between
military necessity and humanitarian considerations. It is a check
and balance system intended to minimize human suffering without
undermining military operations.202 In some respects, the purpose
of IHL – to introduce moderation and restraint in warfare – is
extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
Its very application is
predicated upon the existence of an armed conflict. If that
circumstance does not exist, it is important to recognize that other
principles of international law apply to the conflict – but not IHL.
This enables IHL to continue to do what it does best – regulating
armed conflict – without being diluted through its application to
situations that do not rise to the level of either international or noninternational armed conflict.

202 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 17 (2004) (examining the law of international
armed conflict and exploring its application in hostilities such as Iraq and
Afghanistan).
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